Overview
Supplier invoices are files from strangers, and they now reach AI agents that can pay money. A PDF can carry instructions a person never sees: white text, text under a shape, text off the page. An agent that reads the text layer reads them too. And the oldest fraud still works: a convincing "we changed banks" letter.
Tally is an airlock between those files and a finance team's money. Each invoice is opened in its own Microsandbox microVM on a Vultr VX1 instance, with no network and no keys; only page images and a report of anything hidden or active come out. Two vision models of different families on Vultr Serverless Inference (GLM reads, Qwen checks) copy the images into fixed fields; they have no tools and decide nothing. Fixed code holds the invoice unless the vendor, bank details and purchase order match the records on file, the numbers add up, it is not a duplicate, and both readings agree. A person approves, payment is always recorded to the bank details on file, and every step goes in a hash-chained ledger.
A desk device (an ESP32-S3 with a microphone and a speaker) announces each hold and why ("call them on the number on file") and answers spoken questions, through Vultr speech-to-text and text-to-speech. It can put an invoice on hold; it has no way to approve one. Measured on the live host: on 24 attack files, Tally did as expected 95 times in 96 with no wrong payment, while a naive agent reading the text layer with a pay tool missed 43 to 108 holds in 288 decisions.
On 200 FATURA invoices it had never seen, both readings agreed on every payment field for 78%; the rest are held for a person. Model calls cost about $0.0055 an invoice, and one $55-a-month host checks about 1,300 invoices an hour.